Experimental Market Design

A vignette study on participation in medical trials shows that many observers view high payments as repugnant, especially for poorer participants. Repugnance rises with the effect on participation and is weaker for in-kind incentives.

Introducing intention-based social preferences into mechanism design, this paper explores how reciprocity information affects implementability and welfare in multidimensional settings with both payoff and reciprocity types.

Continuous double auctions lie at the core of modern financial exchanges. This study uses controlled experiments to examine how prices converge to competitive equilibrium and how early-stage trading dynamics can create systematic advantages for certain participants.

Across three laboratory experiments, public discourse increases socially responsible behavior in markets. Effects are robust across settings, but disappear when discourse is optional. Dialogue can significantly improve market outcomes.

Experiments varying both trust and contract enforcement show they can act as complements. Richer enforcement creates more equilibria, where trust becomes critical for selecting efficient outcomes. Results have implications for policy and institutional design.

A lab-in-the-field experiment with US participants and SNAP recipients examines non-welfarist motives for restricting recipients' choices, finding interventionist preferences are widespread and often based on misperceptions.