Since 2021
Leading researchers, at the frontier of market design
The Market Design Seminar Series brings leading researchers and promising young scholars to Zurich to present their work, exchange ideas, and connect with the community.
The frontier of market design
Seminar Series
Since 2021, we've brought some of the field's leading researchers and promising young scholars to Zurich to present their latest work.
Spring 2026
3 talks
Simon Jantschgi
University of Zurich
Minimizing Volatility: Optimal Adjustment with Evolving Feasibility Constraints
Justin Hadad
University of Oxford
What Makes a Matching Market Congested
Daniel Linnenbrink
University of Mannheim
Pay-as-Bid Auctions with Private Information
Spring 2025
3 talks
Olivier Bochet
NYU Abu Dhabi
Benchmark Strategies in Mechanism Design
Tayfun Sönmez
Boston College
Informed Neutrality in Minimalist Market Design: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India
Simon Jantschgi
University of Zurich
Competitive Combinatorial Exchange
Fall 2024
2 talks
Alexey Kushnir
Carnegie Mellon
Selling with Network Flows: A New Approach to Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms
Alexey Kushnir
Carnegie Mellon
Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets
Spring 2024
2 talks
Shengwu Li
Harvard University
What's My Employee Worth: The Effects of Salary Benchmarking
Éva Tardos
Cornell University
Stability and Learning in Games with Carry-over Effects between Rounds
Fall 2023
3 talks
Axel Ockenfels
University of Cologne and Max Planck Institute
Why Is the Soft Floor Auction So Popular?
Catharina Calsamiglia
Barcelona School of Economics
The Design of University Entrance Exams and Its Implications for Gender Gaps
Estelle Cantillon
Université libre de Bruxelles
The Benefits and Costs of Information: Evidence from the New Zealand Wholesale Electricity Market
Spring 2023
2 talks
Joseph Root
University of Chicago
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching
Larry Samuelson
Yale University
Investment and Matching
Fall 2022
1 talk
Tim Roughgarden
Columbia University
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Spring 2022
2 talks
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
Alexander Teytelboym
University of Oxford
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
Fall 2021
7 talks
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford
Art of Multi-Product Auction Design
Marek Pycia
University of Zurich
Market Design
Peter Cramton
University of Cologne
Fostering Resiliency with Good Market Design: Lessons from Texas
Emilio Calvano
University of Bologna
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion
Martin Bichler
Technical University of Munich
Designing Markets with Complex Constraints
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Technology Neutral vs. Technology Specific Procurement
Paul Milgrom
Stanford University
Linear Pricing Mechanisms without Convexity
Spring 2021
6 talksAxel Ockenfels
University of Cologne
Negotiating Climate Cooperation
Eric Budish
Chicago Booth
The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain
Al Roth
Stanford University
Controversial Markets
Nick Arnosti
Columbia Business School
Lotteries for Shared Experiences
Rodrigo Velez
Texas A&M University
Empirical Strategy-Proofness
Pär Holmberg
Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Multi-Product Supply Function Equilibria