Speaker: Natalia Fabra (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Title: Technology Neutral vs. Technology Specific Procurement
Abstract: An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology specific or technology neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the nature of the available technologies, the extent of information asymmetry regarding their costs, the costs of public funds, and the degree of market power. We illustrate the use of our theory for policy analysis with an ex-ante evaluation of Spain’s recent renewable auction.
Bio: Natalia Fabra is Professor of Economics at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. She is Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Associate Member of the Toulouse School of Economics and Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group. She belongs to the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP) of the European Commission. She obtained her PhD in 2001 at the European University Institute (Florence), under the supervision of Prof. Massimo Motta. Natalia works in the field of Industrial Organization, with emphasis in Energy and Environmental Economics and Regulation and Competition Policy. Her research papers are published in leading journals such as the American Economic Review, Management Science, The Rand Journal of Economics, The Economic Journal, Energy Economics, The Journal of Industrial Economics, and the International Journal of Industrial Organization, among others. Natalia is Associate Editor at the Economic Journal and the Journal of Industrial Economics.
