Abstract: Empirical tests of direct revelation games of strategy-proof social choice functions show behavior in these games can approximate suboptimal mutual best responses. We determine that this worst case scenario for the operation of these mechanisms is only likely to be observed when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition and information is not interior. Our analysis is based on an empirical approach to the refinement of Nash equilibrium that we introduce, and the characterization of direct robust full implementation based on this solution concept. Experimental and empirical evidence on these games supports our findings.
Bio: Rodrigo A. Velez is an Associate Professor of Economics at Texas A&M University. His research focuses on the theoretical aspects of the design of economic institutions. His current work informs the standard model for mechanism design with regularities observed in economics experiments and empirical data. He is also interested in the incentives and computational aspects of algorithms for the allocation of resources, an active field of research in the intersection of economics and theoretical computer science. More about his research can be found at: https://sites.google.com/site/rodrigoavelezswebpage/home
